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Introduction 
 
The 1990s were characterized by an intensification of Regional Trade Agree-
ments in the Americas. The main agreements are the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) –signed in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
(and more recently Venezuela), with Bolivia, Chili, Peru, Colombia, and Equator 
as associates- and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) –signed in 
1994 between Canada, Mexico and the United States with more and more 
agreements with other L.A. countries (Chili, Peru, Equator…)
1. Since 1994, a 
Free Trade Area Agreement for the Americas has been discussed, as an exten-
sion of NAFTA. In the spirit of Eichengreen and Taylor (2004), this paper 
analyses the monetary consequences of this trade integration process. We con-
sider a sample of five countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay- 
that account for some 70 per cent of the region’s GDP spanning the period 1991-
2007. 
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The main question raised in this paper refers to the feasibility of a mone-
tary union between these countries. To this end, we study whether this set of 
countries is characterized by business cycle synchronization with the occurrence 
of common shocks, a strong similarity in the adjustment process and the conver-
gence of policy responses. We especially focus our attention on two points. First, 
we try to determine to what extent international disturbances influence the do-
mestic business cycles through trade and/or financial channels. Second, we ana-
lyze the impact of the adoption of different exchange rate regimes on the coun-
tries’ responses to shocks. All these features are the main issues in the literature 
relative to regional integration and OCA process.  
The present paper is linked to two separate strands of literature. The first 
one, dedicated to the debate of monetary union versus dollarization, includes 
numerous papers analyzing the situation of Central and Latin American coun-
tries (LAC) relative to the United States
2. Whatever the criteria –real output fluc-
tuations, prices co-movements, trade integration, and exchange rate variability, 
empirical studies suggest that dollarization is not an obvious solution, even for 
Mexico. Karas (2003) finds that Mexican output fluctuations have been nega-
tively correlated with the American fluctuations. Alesina et al. (2003) show that 
if Mexico is more linked to the United States from the co-movements of prices 
standpoint, co-movements of outputs with the Euro zone and the United States 
do not exhibit significant differences. Hallwood et al (2006) find that none of the 
South American countries has prices and/or output disturbances significantly 
correlated with the United States. Their results exhibit some correlation of Bra-
zilian, Chilean and Uruguayan permanent shocks with Argentina suggesting that 
monetary union could be a better solution than dollarization. Allegret and Sand-
Zantman (2008) propose a semi-structural VAR approach and a state-space 
model and show the weak convergence of the economic policies between the 
Mercosur countries. They stress that the main impediments to the convergence 
of economic policy are the divergence of the exchange rate regimes inside the 
area, and the lack of financial structure convergence. The second strand of litera-
ture analyses the sources of business cycles fluctuations in emerging countries. 
Two lessons from this literature are especially interesting for our purpose. On 
the one hand, a large body of studies suggests that the main source of fluctua-
tions originated from external factors. Aiolfi et al (2006) –considering a sample 
of four LAC3- identify the presence of a common regional factor. Taking into 
account the weak intra-regional trade integration, this result suggests that the 
regional business cycle (major turning points are common to the four countries) 
is driven by external variables and common external shocks. Maćkowiak (2007) 
                                                 
2. See for instance Alesina et al. (2003), Karas (2003), Larrain and Tavares (2003), Hallwood et al. 
(2006), and Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2007 and 2008). 
3. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico over the period 1970-2004. Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
  281
builds structural VAR models with block exogeneity ensuring that domestic 
shocks do not affect external variables. His main result is that external shocks 
account for a major source of macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging coun-
tries4. More precisely, if US monetary policy shocks significantly affect domes-
tic variables in emerging countries, the magnitude of fluctuations explained by 
these shocks is lower relative to shocks driven by other external shocks (such as 
world commodity prices shocks). All these results suggest the presence of a 
“continental business cycle” (Canova, 2005:243) driven by US shocks and/or by 
international shocks. On the other hand, Ahmed (2003) and Canova (2005) con-
clude that the financial channel is especially significant in understanding the in-
fluence of external shocks on domestic business cycle fluctuations in LAC. Us-
ing a dynamic panel setting with annual data over the period 1983-1999, Ahmed 
(2003) finds that US three months real interest rate shocks explain a significant 
share of output fluctuations in these countries. Canova (2005) shows, over the 
period 1990-2002, that US real shocks (demand and supply disturbances) exert a 
weak influence while US monetary policy shocks generates stronger output fluc-
tuations in LAC. As a result, the financial channel is more significant than the 
trade channel5. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains 
the methodology adopted in this paper and founded on Bayesian VAR models. 
Section 2 presents the macroeconomic variables included in the VAR. Section 3 
proposes a method to consider non-stationarity and structural breaks of the se-
lected variables. Section 4 presents the model analyses our main results. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
 
1.  A Bayesian VAR Methodology 
 
In the context of strong links of macroeconomic variables with complex feed-
back linkages, the Vector autoregression (VAR) and the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) approaches constitute useful tools to catch the trends and in-
terdependences between multiple time series. The VMA (vector moving aver-
age) representation of the reduced form allows us to express the current and past 
values of the shocks, to trace out their time path on the variables contained in the 
VAR system, and to compute the impact multipliers (deduced from the impulse 
response functions). The forecast error variance decomposition indicates the 
proportion of the movement in a sequence due to its own shocks versus shocks 
to the other variables. Thus, the convergence of evidence revealed by the tests, 
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the impulse response functions, the forecast error variance decomposition and 
other forecasting properties give us some guidelines to choose between alterna-
tive theories. More frequently than in the case of monetary policy literature, the 
“regional unification” literature uses relatively large scale models with more 
than three of four variables. And contrary to the monetary case (Sims, 1996, 
Bernanke, 1996, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999), no common wisdom 
can facilitate the interpretation of impulse responses and forecast variance analy-
sis. 
One of the main issues of these experiments comes from the identifica-
tion of shocks. We use here the Cholesky ordering. It is the usual and least theo-
retical method to orthogonalize shocks (this kind of “informal” structural VAR 
is usually called either recursive VAR or RVAR, or, as in Doan (2007), semi-
structural VAR or SSVAR). The ordering is based on theoretical intuition and 
more formally on the results of the impulse responses and forecast error variance 
decomposition.  
Undeniably, the sample is short and the number of variables fairly high. 
In this case, Litterman (1979, 1984) suggests specifying blurred restrictions on 
the mean and variance of the coefficients in a Bayesian VAR methodology. As 
indicated by Canova (2007), priors on the mean and variance of the variable al-
low dealing as with over parametrization than with “ad hoc” exclusions. 
The choice of priors is the simplest one: overweighting the first lags of endoge-
nous variables of each equation.  
 
 
2.  Variables Selection and Sample Period 
 
Our choice of variables (see Appendix 1 for data sources) is in part based on the 
traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks and macroeconomic pack-
ages in open economies, but also on the literature dedicated to the sudden stop 
problem (Calvo et al., 2004). 
Each domestic VAR includes three external variables. As real external 
shocks, we consider (i) the Gross Domestic Product for the G7 (noted LGDPG7) 
and (ii) the world commodities prices excluding oil (noted WCPNO). Our choice 
to exclude oil from our commodities prices index is due to the fact that some 
LAC (for instance Brazil and Mexico) are both producers and consumers of oil. 
As a result, responses to shocks are difficult to interpret in such a situation. Fur-
thermore, taking into account only food or agricultural products seemed too re-
strictive
6. 
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The Emerging Economy spread index of J.P. Morgan (EMBI)
7 accounts 
for the international financial shock. Many studies chose US interest rates or in-
ternational interest rates –such as LIBOR- to estimate the impact of external fi-
nancial shocks on emerging markets. We prefer to use the EMBI in order to dis-
entangle monetary policy shocks and financial shocks. Further, over our sample 
period, the EMBI does not seem significantly influenced by LIBOR, confirming 
the González-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005) results which show that spreads 
are determined by global factors
8. Uribe and Yue (2006) analyze the respective 
influence of US interest rates and EMBI shocks on the macroeconomic fluctua-
tions in a sample of seven emerging countries covering the period 1994-2001. 
An important finding is that EMBI shocks exacerbate the US interest rate shocks, 
implying a strong macroeconomic volatility in the studied emerging countries. 
For the domestic variables (noted for each country “i”, i = A for Argen-
tina, B for Brazil, C for Chile, M for Mexico, and U for Uruguay), we took the 
foreign reserves noted i_FOREX (as proxy for the balance of payments, and in 
particular for financial account), Gross Domestic Product (i_GDP), Consump-
tion Prices Index (i_CPI), the nominal money market interest rate (i_R) and the 
real effective exchange rate
9 (i_ER). 
Calvo et al. (2004) stress that sudden stop episodes are characterized by 
both international reserves losses and sharp current account reversals. The for-
mer increases the country vulnerability to shocks while the latter leads to output 
and employment contractions. Balance of payments quarterly data are not reli-
able and subject to sizable revisions. As a result, our VARs does not include cur-
rent account data. As a proxy for sudden stop problems, we chose to include 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. In order to test the robustness of the 
results, we substitute i_TCT -the deseasonalized exports-imports ratio- to 
i_FOREX. The TCT ratio represents a proxy for the intertemporal constraint of 
the current account: a decrease in capital inflows imposes the reduction of ab-
sorption in order to increase exports and decrease imports. Interestingly, the re-
sults do not change significantly. As a result, we prefer to consider only the 
                                                 
7 We merged two time series: the EMBI for the period 1991Q1-1997Q4 and the EMBI+ from 
1998Q1. As indicated in Cunningham (1999), the main differences between these indices are (i) 
the number of financial instruments embodied (the EMBI tracks returns and spreads on Brady 
Bonds and some other restructured sovereign debts, the EMBI+ tracks returns on a wider range of 
instruments), (ii) the number of countries (11 for the EMBI, 16 for the EMBI+). However, in both 
indices the weight of the LAC (Latin American countries) is very important (respectively 83.8% 
and 70.2%). Amongst the LAC, both Argentina and Brazil account for 47.6% of the EMBI+. In 
1999, J.P.Morgan released a new index, the EMBIG (for “global”) embodying more countries (27) 
and more titles. In this last index, LAC decreased to 61.5%.  
8. We perform different experiments in our VARs: first, we include both LIBOR and EMBI; sec-
ond, we include only LIBOR. Results do not significantly change. Granger causality tests do not 
exhibit relations between EMBI and LIBOR. 
9. An increase (decrease) in the real exchange rate means real depreciation (appreciation). Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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FOREX variables in order to avoid some interpretation difficulties owing to the 
fact that the TCT ratio obeys in part to competitive factors, and not exclusively 
to financial factors. 
Exchange rate regimes and real bilateral exchange rate variability consti-
tute significant concerns for trade and financial integration process. In Mercosur 
countries, these concerns became significant after 1998, when the region was hit 
by a wave of international shocks (Machinea, 2004). From this perspective, 
Silva et al. (2004), using a conventional Mundell-Fleming framework, provide 
suggestive conclusions concerning the impact of different exchange rate regimes 
on the synchronization of business cycle fluctuations. They compare the situa-
tion of Argentina and Brazil after different shocks (domestic or external). Their 
VECM suggests that Argentina followed strict “currency board” rules (with a 
very quick adjustment between the foreign reserves and the monetary base in the 
error correction expression) while Brazilian monetary policy had a discretionary 
character based on the sterilization policy of the central bank (i.e. a sluggish ad-
justment of the E.C.M.). Briefly, the two countries experienced dissimilar 
mechanisms of adjustment to similar negative external shocks, the problem be-
ing exacerbated after the Brazilian exchange rate regime collapse in 1999. 
Appendix 2 shows the exchange rate regimes adopted by each country 
over the same period. At the beginning period (1991), the set of countries ranges 
from hard peg (Argentine currency board) to intermediate regimes, while the end 
of the period exhibits a clear switch toward floating regimes. We try to deter-
mine to what extent different exchange rate regimes can explain different ad-
justments to similar shocks. Canova find “little evidence supporting the idea that 
the exchange rate regime matters for both the magnitude of output responses and 
the mechanics of transmission of US shocks” (Canova, 2005: 246). Similarly, 
Maćkowiak (2007) concludes that the contribution of external disturbances to 
domestic fluctuations is independent of the exchange rate regime. On the other 
hand, Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2008) find that exchange rate regimes matter 
to explain the different responses of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay to similar 
shocks. To this end, the VAR models take into account the question of the ex-
change rate through the real effective exchange rate for each of the five countries 
of the sample. 
Our analysis focuses on the period following the recovery (due to the re-
turn international capital flows). The sample is relatively short: indeed, not only 
the quality of data for long periods is low in emerging countries but also during 
the 80s, the five economies were very instable mainly due to the debt crisis and 
the bouts of hyperinflation: such disturbances make data processing very com-
plex and unstable. Therefore, our study begins in 1991 by taking into account 
more stabilized economies. In addition, as our approach of monetary integration 
is based on business cycle dynamics, we use quarterly data. Such data are only Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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available and comparable since 1990 for the five countries. Thus, the paper uses 
quarterly frequency for the period 1991-Q1-2007-Q1. 
 
 
3.  Non-Stationarity and Structural Breaks: the Special Case of Emerging 
Economies  
 
As noted above, the emerging economies case is not the simplest one to use 
times series methodology. Since the seminal works of Nelson and Plosser 
(1982), most macroeconomic time series in level are considered unit root proc-
ess (i.e. generally I(1), and in some cases I(2)); and for the industrialized 
economies, availability of long run times series and economic stability allowed 
to hinge on unit root and cointegration common tests.  
On the same sample than Nelson and Plosser, Perron (1989) challenged 
this interpretation, indicating that most macroeconomic variables are trend sta-
tionary, coupled with structural breaks. Looking at the Latin-American macro-
economic time series, we assert the same hypothesis: indeed, in the case of Latin 
America, as for other Emerging countries, the econometricians had to take into 
account structural breaks due to non random external and internal shocks and 
change of policy regimes. The right way to deal with this question consists (in 
the Perron procedure) to test for unit roots in the presence of structural change at 
a known date. If the date of the break is uncertain, other tests are available (Vo-
gelsang and Perron, 1998, or Zivot and Andrews, 2002) on common softwares. 
However, as shown in Le Bihan (2004) all of these procedures are powerless 
when the number and date of the break are unknown. Overall, the combination 
of a short sample and multiple breaks weaken the break diagnosis compared to 
the following unit root test.  
We choose a rougher but probably more secure method. First we identi-
fied the noticeable breaks of the figures
10 as being well-known historical ones 
(due for instance to a balance of payments crisis, or switches of policy regime): 
the results are displayed in Appendix 3. As particular (and generally determinis-
tic) events, these breaks can hardly be considered as the n.i.d. stochastic innova-
tions of a random walk. Then, in order to the macroeconomic series, we clean 
them from the various deterministic trends and intercept leaps, using simply time 
trends and dummy variables. We finish with a common A.D.F. test, finding all 
series stationary. 
Thus, we can exclude any cointegration relationship but a VAR in level 
is an available alternative to the VECM one; so we choose a recursive semi-
structural approach for a VAR in level of the detrended series. 
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4.  The model and the main results. 
 
The model 
The following order of Choleski factorization is deduced from our theoretical 
interpretation of the contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form re-
siduals of each country model and from block exogeneity Wald tests. The num-
ber of lags –two in each model- has been selected using the common set of crite-
ria and tests. As the inverse roots of the AR polynomial lie in the unit circle, 
VARs satisfy the stability condition. External variables are considered as the 
most exogenous. We assume that real external variables are predetermined rela-
tive to external financial ones. In addition, we consider that the GDP of the G7 
countries exerts an influence on commodities prices through a demand effect. 
For domestic variables, different plausible orders have been experi-
mented. They do not significantly change results except if i_FOREX is consid-
ered as the most exogenous domestic variables. But in this case results are 
largely irrelevant from an economic viewpoint. 
As a result, for each economy we test the following VAR: 
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Results 
Using this framework, we combine the impulse response functions (tracing out 
the time paths of the effects of pure shocks on the set of variables), and the fore-Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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cast error variance decomposition (indicating the proportion of the movements 
in a sequence due to its own shocks versus other variables). These experiments 
aim at identifying what kind of shocks, real or nominal, drive economic fluctua-
tions in the three countries. 
This allows us to assess the similarities in the reactions of macroeco-
nomic variables to these shocks. At the same time, we will get a first outline of 
the specific -versus common- economic consequences of shocks in terms of 
spontaneous adjustments, as well as in terms of policy responses. The results are 
presented in Appendix 4 and 5. 
 
Responses of domestic variables to external shocks: is transmission real or fi-
nancial? 
In this paragraph, we try to identify to what extent international shocks are 
transmitted to domestic variables through real or financial disturbances. To this 
end, we consider the responses to shocks and variance decompositions of all 
domestic variables –except FOREX- in the five studied countries. 
Broadly speaking, variance decompositions show that all studied coun-
tries are significantly influenced by foreign variables. For instance, in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile foreign variables explain at least 29% of the GDP variance de-
compositions after 16 quarters. In Mexico and Uruguay, the shares are 16.1% 
and 20% respectively. In addition, no domestic variables –except i_GDP them-
selves- exert a higher influence than foreign innovations in all countries. LA 
countries differ according to the specific influence of real and financial vari-
ables. If we consider real foreign variables, i.e. GDPG7 and WCPNO, we see 
that both GDPG7 and WCPNO innovations explain a significant part of the GDP 
variance in Brazil (26.5% and 23.5% respectively) while in Chile WCPNO 
shocks explain 39% of the GDP variance. Argentina is more influenced by inno-
vations on WCPNO than on GDPG7 ones, but the respective shares are consid-
erably lower than for Brazil and Chile. If the variance decomposition of Uru-
guayan GDP does not seem impacted by real foreign variables, it does not mean 
that Uruguay is a closed economy. Indeed, economic activity in this country de-
pends mainly on Argentine and Brazilian business cycles. VAR models built in 
this paper do not take into account such interdependencies between LAC. 
A large body of empirical literature dedicated to business cycle in LAC 
stresses that growth in LAC follows international capital flows. More precisely, 
these studies suggest that the behavior of capital inflows is pro-cyclical: they 
tend to increase when growth in LAC improves. As a result, we can expect a 
significant influence of EMBI shocks on GDP during the period on our sample 
of countries. On this point, our results are mixed since international financial 
shocks matter only in Argentina and Uruguay. In the former, EMBI innovations 
explain more than 14% of the A_GDP variance after 8 quarters while in the lat-
ter, U_GDP variance decompositions suggest that 12.3% of its variance is ex-Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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plained by the international financial shocks after 4 quarters and around 15% 
after 8 quarters. 
It is important to stress that in these two countries, trade channel, based 
on GDPG7 and WCPNO shocks, are less important than in the three other coun-
tries. From this standpoint, it seems relevant to distinguish two groups of coun-
tries: a first one, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico in which trade channels 
predominate and a second group, composed of Argentina and Uruguay where 
the financial channels exert the main influence on GDP variances. 
As expected, in countries where the responses are significant (Argentina and 
Chile),  GDP increases after a shock on GDPG7. The positive influence of 
GDPG7 means that improvement (vs degradation) of the business cycle in G7 
countries can result in an increase (vs slowdown) of growth in LAC. However, 
responses are significant only contemporaneously (Argentina) or in the short-run 
(4 quarters in Chile). In countries where GDP responses to GDPG7 shocks are 
insignificant, this result rests on different reasons. As stressed above, Uruguay 
tends to respond more to the Argentinean and Brazilian shocks than to industrial 
country ones while Brazil is a closed economy relatively to other studied coun-
tries. Mexico shows a priori a surprising result. Indeed, the degree of openness 
(45% of GDP) is considerably higher than Brazil one while our result suggests 
the lack of influence of GDPG7 fluctuations on the Mexican economy. Such 
finding does not seem contradictory with the high degree of openness of Mexico. 
It is important to recall that, over the considered sample period, Mexico had ex-
perienced both a weak economic growth and a lower volatile GDP than in other 
studied LA countries. As a consequence, as showed in appendix 4, M_GDP ex-
hibits weak or insignificant responses to shocks envisaged in this paper
11. In ad-
dition, as stressed by the International Monetary Fund, in 2001-2002 Mexico 
experienced, for the first time over our sample period, a weak economic activity 
explained not by domestic factors but by the US economic slowdown
12. In Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Uruguay, consumption prices increase after the GDPG7 
shock. But responses of consumption prices are weakly significant (in the case 
of Argentina and Uruguay) or very short-lived (for Brazil). Interest rates and real 
exchange rates responses exhibit a similar trend: they are insignificant or short-
lived. 
In all countries except Uruguay, GDP increases after a shock on com-
modities prices (WCPNO) confirming the importance of commodities in LACs’ 
business cycles. Not only contemporaneous responses are significant and posi-
tive but we also observe significant persistent effects. Interestingly, CPI strongly 
increases in Uruguay after a shock on WCPNO and this increase prevails over 
time. As Uruguay is both an exporter and importer of primary commodities, it is 
                                                 
11. At the same time, GDPG7 volatility had been particularly low. 
12 See IMF (2002), IMF Country Report N°02/237, October. Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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difficult to disentangle between a demand effect (exports) and a supply effect 
(imports). The response of U_GDP to a shock on WCPNO suggests that the sec-
ond effect is probably the most relevant: over the considered period, Uruguay 
suffers from increases in commodities prices. Variance decompositions of 
U_GDP and U_CPI confirm this observation: while WCPNO innovations ex-
plain around 3% of the Uruguayan GDP variance after 16 quarters, it explains 
more than 31% of the CPI variance. In all countries, responses of interest rates 
and real exchange rates to WCPNO innovations are short-lived or weakly sig-
nificant. 
In countries where the international financial shock is significant, GDP 
decreases after a shock on EMBI. The magnitude of the GDP response is impor-
tant in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent in Mexico. Variance de-
compositions of GDP support this result. In both Argentina and Uruguay, EMBI 
innovations explain more than 15% of the GDP variance after 16 quarters, while 
in Mexico this share is considerably lower (5%). Our findings confirm Allegret 
and Sand-Zantman (2008) about the specific sensitivity of Argentina to EMBI 
shock. During the first half of the 90s, Argentina was one of the main borrowers 
in international capital markets enjoying very favorable financing conditions, 
while in the second half of the decade the economy suffered from a sudden-stop 
of capital inflows. In addition, the monetary policy constraints due to the cur-
rency board limited the ability of authorities to react in the face of EMBI shocks, 
inducing strong and ample macroeconomic variability. 
As expected, in the major part of our sample countries, the real exchange 
rate depreciates after the EMBI shock. Indeed, an increase in the risk premium 
implies that investments in emerging markets are less attractive leading to capi-
tal outflows. However, the responses of the exchange rates are short-lived. 
The Chilean case is particularly interesting. While the Chilean spread stayed 
substantially below EMBI+ or Latin American spread over the period, C_GDP 
responds negatively to EMBI shock. Even if the response is weakly significant 
from a statistical point of view, this result suggests that this type of shock is 
global, i.e. affects all countries, even economies beneficing from low idiosyn-
cratic risk premium. Recall that the macroeconomic situation of this country and 
the monetary framework introduced in 1991 significantly decreases its risk pre-
mium. The responses of the domestic interest rates strengthen this observation. 
Domestic interest rates increase after the EMBI shock, suggesting a financial 
transmission of EMBI shocks to domestic variables. If this transmission must be 
nuanced for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay owing to the fact that inter-
est rates responses are short-lived and/or weakly significant, the response of the 
Chilean interest rate deserves attention. Indeed, not only EMBI shock is followed 
by an increase in interest rate in this country, but the international financial 
shock explains more than 21% of the C_R variance after 16 quarters. In other 
words, Chile cannot avoid a financial transmission through its interest rate –Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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which increases significantly- even if the effect is short (due to the credibility 
effect of its monetary policy framework). 
 
 
The behavior and the role of FOREX (foreign reserves) variable: the relevance 
of the sudden stop 
Two main points characterize the sudden stop literature. First, external factors 
exert a decisive influence on capital inflows into emerging markets. Second, de-
preciation results in contractionary output in emerging markets while it produces 
the traditional expansionist effects in industrialized countries (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2001). Indeed, exchange rate crises in emerging markets are followed 
by a sudden stop to capital inflows. These countries suffer from reserve losses 
and severe reversal in the current account deficit. Such reversal is based on a 
major decline in aggregates.  
In order to assess the relevance of the sudden stop literature, we deter-
mine what variables –foreign or domestic, real or financial- exert the main influ-
ence on FOREX included in our VARs as a proxy of international capital flows. 
The theoretical prediction is that international financial shocks, here the EMBI 
shock- are the main variables influencing FOREX in our five countries. In addi-
tion, we analyze the influence of FOREX on other domestic variables. According 
to the sudden stop literature, a negative shock on FOREX must lead to a contrac-
tion in GDP. 
Interestingly, from the sudden stop literature standpoint, FOREX is in-
fluenced by international variables, and more specifically by financial variables. 
FOREX responses WCPNO shocks and variance decompositions of FOREX ex-
hibit the weak influence of world commodities prices except in Mexico. In this 
country, international reserves increase after the WCPNO shock and the response 
remains significant over 4 quarters. In addition, WCPNO innovations explain 
11% of the FOREX variance. It is the main explanatory variable of FOREX vari-
ance after M_CPI.  GDPG7 shocks do not lead to significant responses of 
FOREX except in Brazil where international reserves increase contemporane-
ously to the shock. The international financial shock produces the expected ef-
fects when significant. Thus, an increase in the spread –meaning degradation in 
the financial conditions for emerging countries- leads to a decrease in FOREX in 
Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Chile after 3 quarters. Variance 
decompositions support the significant influence of EMBI on the behavior of 
FOREX. In Argentina, Brazil and Chile, EMBI innovations explain 15.4%; 8.2% 
and 7.8% of the FOREX variance. In the three countries, EMBI is its main ex-
planatory variable.  
Few domestic variables react to FOREX innovations. In Argentina, con-
sumptions prices increase after a shock on FOREX at the impact and after 3 
quarters. This response is conformed to the conventional wisdom: in a currency Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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board regime, monetary expansion rests on the accumulation of international 
reserves by the central bank. Chilean prices increase in the aftermath of FOREX 
innovations. In the two countries, FOREX innovations are one of the main ex-
planatory variables of the variance of CPI. Shocks on FOREX lead to real ex-
change rates appreciations. This reaction is especially persistent in Uruguay and 
Argentina, but to a lesser extent in this country. The fact that the FOREX shock 
generates few domestic fluctuations does not necessarily contradict the sudden 
stop literature. Indeed, as stressed by Izquierdo et al. (2007), episodes of finan-
cial volatility tend to produce effects on real variables only in the short-run. A 
plausible explanation of our deceptive results is that the more significant effects 
of sudden stop on domestic variables are absorbed extremely rapidly, within one 
or two quarters. VAR models in level are not well-equipped to detect these types 
of changes. Indeed, such models analyze the responses of macroeconomic vari-
ables to shocks of standard magnitude (usually one standard deviation), and not 
to unusual disturbances proper to crisis episodes. In addition, the main purpose 
of VAR models is not to identify crisis events. Crisis episodes are relevant only 
if they lead to structural breaks in the studied macroeconomic series. 
 
Responses of domestic variables to domestic shocks 
Shocks on GDP are interpreted as real ones. After a real domestic shock, we ob-
serve significant responses of CPI in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. Prices de-
crease after the shock. Responses are short-lived in both Brazil and Uruguay 
while Argentine prices react at medium run. The decrease in prices in the after-
math of GDP shock suggests that such shock produces a supply effect. Variance 
decompositions of CPI exhibit persistent effects. In the medium-long run, the 
share of the CPI variance explained by GDP innovations amounts to 15% after 
16 periods in Argentina. Interest rate responses are weakly significant or short-
lived in all countries. Responses of real exchange rates to GDP shocks are very 
short-lived and weakly significant. As expected, a shock on GDP is followed by 
a real exchange rate appreciation. Overall, GDP shocks do not lead to significant 
responses of other variables. Variance decompositions bring out the fact that few 
other domestic variables have their variance in part explained by GDP innova-
tions. Over the studied period, as suggested by Allegret and Sand-Zantman 
(2008) for the industrial production index, the GDP is an adjustment variable. 
This similarity across our five countries is explained by monetary policy con-
straints faced by domestic authorities either in the case of a hard peg or in the 
case of an economic policy based on the fight against inflation. 
We consider a shock on CPI as a nominal demand one. Except in Brazil 
–where the GDP increases over 3 quarters in the aftermath of the shock- CPI 
shocks do not lead to significant responses of real variables, i.e. GDP. However, 
innovations on prices exert an influence on other domestic variables. Given the 
importance of the inflationary history of numerous LA countries, the responses Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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of interest rates are particularly significant. Responses of interest rates allow us 
to discriminate between credible and less credible countries. In Argentina and 
Chile, interest rates decrease or do not react after a CPI shock. In these two 
countries, inflation expectations are well anchored by the monetary regime in 
place in each country. Recall that from 1991 to 2001, Argentina had experienced 
a currency board arrangement while Chile had adopted an inflation targeting 
framework since 1991. In countries with soft pegs and a monetary policy not 
based on inflation targeting framework –as Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay- infla-
tion expectations are imperfectly anchored. So, in such countries, shocks on 
prices induce higher fluctuations. Variance decompositions exhibit a clear pic-
ture. In Argentina and Chile, CPI innovations explain a mild or marginal share 
of the interest rate variances, respectively 8.7 and 0.2 contemporaneously; and 
12.8 and 1.8 after 16 quarters, while in Brazil the respective shares are 70.9% 
and 68.2%. In this latter country interest innovations explain only a weak share 
of the CPI variance (0% contemporaneously and 10.2% after 16 quarters). As 
expected, CPI shocks lead to real exchange rate appreciations. In comparison 
with countries enjoying an imperfect monetary credibility, the responses of the 
real exchange rate are short-lived in Argentina and Chile. 
The innovations on nominal interest rates are monetary policy shocks. 
The adjustments after an interest rate shock are rapid in the five countries: the 
main part of the adjustment for the set of endogenous variable lasts four quar-
ters. Most frequently, variance decompositions suggest that innovations on inter-
est rates are not a relevant explicative variable. The most impacted domestic 
variable is the real exchange rate. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico interest rate 
increases are followed by contemporaneous real exchange rate depreciations. 
Interestingly, FOREX does not respond to interest shocks. In other words, in-
creasing the domestic interest rate is insufficient to favor the accumulation of 
international reserves. Such result is in accordance with the sudden stop litera-
ture that suggests that FOREX responds more to global shocks than domestic 
ones. 
Finally, real exchange rate shocks do not produce significant fluctua-
tions in other domestic variables. Variance decompositions confirm this weak 
influence of the Real Exchange Rate over the sample period. We must remember 
that during the main part of the period, monetary authorities had smoothed its 
volatility, either because its adoption as “official” nominal anchor, or to avoid 
“pass through” effects (even after the adoption of inflation targeting and flota-
tion regimes). However, concerning the GDP, impulse responses exhibit an in-
teresting feature when significant: GDP decreases in the aftermath of the real 
depreciation (Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Uruguay). Three competing explana-
tions are advanced in this paper. First, real depreciations may be synonymous of 
economic activity slowdown in the medium-term. Unfortunately, this interpreta-
tion is not confirmed by the behavior of the FOREX variable. Indeed, while a Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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negative response of FOREX to a real depreciation is expected –due to capital 
outflows-we observe in fact insignificant reactions of this variable. Real ex-
change rate innovations do not explain a significant share of FOREX variance in 
the five countries. Second, an alternative explanation of the negative relationship 
between GDP and real depreciation rests on the presence of negative balance 
sheet effects. The inability to borrow abroad in local currency –the so-called 
original sin- and the dollarization of the domestic economy can induce currency 
mismatches in the balance sheets of public and private agents. Using the degree 
of dollarization estimated by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), such an 
explanation seems relevant only in Uruguay
13. Finally, a last explanation, most 
likely relevant in countries with low degrees of dollarization (Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico) suggests that the negative correlation between GDP and real exchange 
rate depreciations stems from shocks that induce both a real depreciation and a 
decline in GDP. Negative terms of trade shocks result in such negative correla-
tion. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This work leads us to five main conclusions. First, our results converge to indi-
cate that Latin American countries are influenced by foreign variables, either the 
real one for Brazil and Chile, or the financial one for Argentina and Uruguay; 
curiously, Mexico seems more independent from foreign influence
14. Second, 
contrary to several studies, we find that real channels seem as important as fi-
nancial ones in explaining the influence of foreign variables on domestic ones in 
the majority of the studied LACs. Third, our attempt to test the relevance of the 
sudden stop literature leads us to mixed conclusions. If our proxy of interna-
tional capital inflows –the FOREX variables- is significantly explained by for-
eign financial variables, the analysis of domestic variable responses to FOREX 
shocks does not follow the predictions of common knowledge. Fourth, our esti-
mates do not allow us to distinguish countries according to their exchange rate 
regimes. A better distinction to analyze the responses to similar shocks may be 
between the credibility degrees of our economies. Finally, from an OCA per-
spective, our study suggests that foreign variables engender a near-common 
                                                 
13. According to the authors, Argentina and Brazil belong to Type I dollarization in which domes-
tic and external liability dollarization co-exist; Uruguay is a dollarized economy of Type II where 
dollarization is predominantly of a domestic nature; and Chile and Mexico are Type III dollariza-
tion: the main part of debt in foreign currencies is external. Degrees of dollarization differ among 
our countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale that goes from 0 to 30) and Uruguay (21), but 
weak in Brazil (7), Chile (7) and Mexico (5). 
14 Such result seems paradoxical; but using the international and domestic industrial product in-
dexes -IPI- instead of the GDP reveals more significantly the links between US and Mexican 
economies. Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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business cycle in the region. Indeed, LACs tend to react similarly to the same 
foreign shocks. An important question is to determine to what extent a monetary 
union may insulate against such shocks. On this point, Edwards (2006) obtains a 
negative answer. Using probit panel regressions to investigate whether countries 
forming a monetary union have a lower occurrence of sudden stop episodes and 
of current account reversal episodes, and whether they are better able to absorb 
external shocks, he finds that belonging to a currency union has not lowered the 
probability of a sudden stop or a current account reversal, and external shocks 
have been amplified in currency union countries. 
A next step of this paper could be the building of a VECM (Vector Error Correc-
tion Model) able to embody short and long run dynamics, allowing us to focus 
on respective speeds of adjustment. Indeed, very different speeds of adjustment 
could prejudice any project of monetary integration (except obviously for the 
endogenous OCA perspective). 
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Appendix 1 Data and Sources 
 
Data Sources 
GDP Group of 
Seven 
OECD 
World commodi-
ties prices ex-
cluding oil 
IMF, International Financial Statistics 
EMBI  Ministry of Economy and Production of the Republic of Argentina 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html) 
GDP   IPEA  (http://www.ipea.gov.br)  for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico 
Central Bank of the Republic of Uruguay 
Consumption 
Prices Index 
IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Foreign Ex-
change Reserves 
IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Money Market 
Interest Rates 
IMF, International Financial Statistics for Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Chile for Chile 
Real Exchange 
rates 
IMF, International Financial Statistics for Chile and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Argentina for Argentina 
IPEA for Brazil 
OECD for Mexico 
 
 
Appendix 2 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Selected Latin American Coun-
tries 
 
Countries  Year/Month  Exchange rate regime  Countries  Year/Month  Exchange rate regime 
Argentina 1990-M1 Independently  floating  Brazil (cont.) 1998-M4  Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1991-M1  Horizontal  band    1999-M1 Independently  floating 
 1991-M3  Currency  board  Chile  1990-M1  Backward-looking crawling peg 
 2001M12  Managed  floating    1998-M9  Forward-looking crawling peg 
  2004M11  Other tightly managed floating   1999-M9 Independently  floating 
Brazil  1990-M1  Backward-looking crawling peg  Mexico  1990-M1  Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1990-M3  Managed  floating    1994-M12 Independently  floating 
  1991-M5  Backward-looking crawling peg  Uruguay  1990_M1  Backward-looking crawling peg 
  1994-M7  Tightly managed    1992_M1  Forward-looking crawling peg 
  1995-M3  Backward-looking crawling peg   2002-M6  Independently  floating 
Source: from A. Bubula and I. Ötker-Robe’s Database. Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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Appendix 3: Structural breaks  
 
International Variables 
 
The Commodity Prices and the EMBI are both marked by a structural break from 
the last quarter of 2001, due to the simultaneity of a Commodity Prices hiking 
and a decrease of EMBI. 
 
Domestic Variables 
 
Argentina :  
Except the economic mayhem at the beginning of the 90s, the only structural 
break (intercepts and trends) comes from the exchange rate collapse of 2002. 
Attacks on Foreign Reserves are perceptible since 2001, with the unhooking of 
both the Foreign Reserves and the Interest Rate.  About one year later, it hits the 
Exchange Rate, the GDP and the CPI. 
Let us note in particular that the Tequila contagion (after the Mexican Crisis of 
1994-95) is not obviously perceptible.  
Brazil:  
Two well known events are worthy of note: the Real Plan in 1994 and the cur-
rency crash of 1998-99. But in 2002, the Argentinean crisis contagion and the 
political uncertainty of the presidential election weighted on the Exchange Rate. 
Except this point, we had to introduce a break for 1994 in the CPI, the Foreign 
Reserves, and the Interest Rate (but curiously neither for the real Exchange Rate 
nor the GDP). The 1998-1999 crisis significantly hit the Exchange Rate and the 
Foreign Reserves (but neither the CPI nor the interest rate).      
Chili: 
The Chilean economy is particularly sensible to international financial mayhem: 
so, the main break is due to the Asian Crisis, in 1997, hitting all the variables 
except the GDP. But the uncertainty following the Argentinean crisis is percep-
tible as much on the Exchange Rate as on the Interest Rate.  
Mexico: 
Obviously, the Currency Crash of 1994-95 hit all the real and nominal variables, 
beginning in the last quarter of 1994 with the Foreign Reserves, the Interest 
Rate, and then hurting the Exchange Rate, the CPI, and the GDP in 1995. 
Uruguay: 
The introduction of structural breaks in the case of Uruguay could be discussed. 
Although some shocks are obviously non-random ones, the high frequency of 
macro-fluctuations in the Uruguayan case turns break detection difficult. How-
ever, two shocks are clearly perceptible, with a break on the GDP (due to the 
Brazilian Currency Crash at the end of 1998) and a break on all the macroeco-
nomic variables (except the CPI) after the Argentinean Crisis of 2002.   Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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Appendix 4 Forecast Error Impulse Responses of One Standard Deviation 
(Innovations ±2 SE) 
 
Argentina 
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Uruguay 
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Appendix 5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition, in percentage 
 
Argentina 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LA_GDP 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LA_ 
GDP 
CYC_LA_ 
CPI 
CYC_LA_ 
FOREX 
CYC_A_ 
R 
CYC_LA_ 
ER 
1 4.19  1.17  0.20 94.43  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 3.70  1.64  1.24 91.28  0.05 1.44  0.35  0.28 
4 3.34  1.47  7.08 81.09  0.05 5.39  0.83  0.73 
8 3.05  5.04 16.13 68.04  0.04 6.05  0.92  0.73 
12 4.95  7.50  15.00 64.50  0.13 5.98  0.94  1.00 
16 6.75  7.73  14.79 61.71  0.37 6.22  1.27  1.15 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LA_CPI 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LA_ 
GDP 
CYC_LA_ 
CPI 
CYC_LA_ 
FOREX 
CYC_A_ 
R 
CYC_LA_ 
ER 
1 1.07  0.36  0.89  0.10  97.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 2.60  1.34  1.93  0.49  91.48 0.29 1.00 0.87 
4 2.18  4.48  2.13  1.00  71.76 14.70 2.68  1.06 
8 5.31  11.72 2.18  7.23  47.48 21.56 3.54  0.98 
12 9.41  13.41  2.11  13.62  38.79 17.53 4.19  0.93 
16 11.28  12.88  2.43  14.91  36.05 16.62 4.96  0.87 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LA_FOREX 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LA_ 
GDP 
CYC_LA_ 
CPI 
CYC_LA_ 
FOREX 
CYC_A_ 
R 
CYC_LA_ 
ER 
1 0.93  4.77  5.32  6.85  1.81 80.31  0.00 0.00 
2 0.67  4.37  6.28  7.38  1.98 79.25  0.07 0.00 
4 0.67  3.47 12.56 12.00  2.31 68.76  0.23 0.00 
8 1.71  3.17 15.25 17.80  2.88 58.39  0.61 0.18 
12 2.37  3.03  14.88 17.76  3.11 57.42  0.94 0.47 
16 2.38  3.09  15.43 17.72  3.13 56.73  1.02 0.49 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_A_R 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LA_ 
GDP 
CYC_LA_ 
CPI 
CYC_LA_ 
FOREX 
CYC_A_ 
R 
CYC_LA_ 
ER 
1 0.60  0.16  3.93  7.08  8.70  2.52 77.01 0.00 
2 0.44  0.18  2.58  4.73  9.78  2.05 79.41 0.84 
4 0.33  1.05  1.77  3.87  13.56  1.44 72.62 5.36 
8 1.82  1.96  1.50  3.41  13.75 1.21  62.19  14.16 
12 5.63  2.03  1.38  3.88  12.91 1.16  56.33  16.69 
16 8.79  2.68  1.28  4.59  12.79 1.70  51.94  16.21 Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LA_ER 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI
CYC_LA_ 
GDP 
CYC_LA_
CPI 
CYC_LA_
FOREX 
CYC_A_ 
R 
CYC_LA_ 
ER 
1 3.94  0.18 0.79 25.92  15.65  5.45 11.26 36.80 
2 3.36  1.00 0.89 20.94  15.58  6.67 12.42 39.15 
4 2.76  5.42 0.96 21.31  15.16  9.10 11.01 34.29 
8  2.33  12.52  1.18  22.20 13.61 9.61 9.29  29.25 
12  2.42  15.22  1.30  21.58 13.14 9.29 9.00  28.05 
16  2.98  15.99  1.29  21.42 12.86 9.24 8.80  27.41 
 
Brazil 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LB_GDP 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LB_ 
GDP 
CYC_LB_
CPI 
CYC_LB_
FOREX 
CYC_ 
B_R 
CYC_LB_ 
ER 
1  0.33  4.15 1.10  94.41  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
2  0.33  13.21  0.96  84.61  0.10  0.25 0.05 0.49 
4  0.63  25.70  1.01  58.99  9.20  0.65 0.04 3.78 
8  8.28  29.03  0.89  41.36 10.49 1.48 0.45 8.02 
12  19.80  26.11  1.03  33.48  8.31  3.27 0.53 7.47 
16  26.48  23.48  0.98  29.89  7.35  4.67 0.48 6.68 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LB_CPI 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LB_ 
GDP 
CYC_LB_
CPI 
CYC_LB_
FOREX 
CYC_ 
B_R 
CYC_LB_ 
ER 
1  6.25  0.30 2.62 6.09  84.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2  8.62  0.49 2.15 4.74  83.18 0.01 0.65 0.16 
4  7.76  1.57 1.85 7.63  72.90 0.66 6.02 1.61 
8 7.52  3.96 1.86  7.01  65.97  1.11 10.23 2.34 
12 8.34  4.09  2.38  6.65  64.54  1.49  10.27  2.25 
16 8.44  4.07  2.77  6.60  64.12  1.53  10.20  2.27 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LB_FOREX 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LB_ 
GDP 
CYC_LB_
CPI 
CYC_LB_
FOREX 
CYC_ 
B_R 
CYC_LB_ 
ER 
1 7.06  0.03 0.53  2.05  0.08  90.26 0.00  0.00 
2 6.97  0.36 0.45  5.19  0.20  86.26 0.29  0.28 
4 5.95  0.45 3.07  6.11  0.83  81.63 1.44  0.53 
8 5.91  0.73 7.65  5.74  1.47  74.31 2.96  1.23 
12 6.30  1.00  8.29  5.53  2.53  71.17  3.12  2.06 
16 7.33  1.20  8.21  5.51  2.63  69.92  3.06  2.13 
                Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_B_R 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LB_ 
GDP 
CYC_LB_
CPI 
CYC_LB_
FOREX 
CYC_ 
B_R 
CYC_LB_ 
ER 
1 2.80  0.13 2.51 10.90  70.91  1.38 11.36 0.00 
2 3.08  0.10 1.75  8.84  72.37  2.48 11.35 0.03 
4 2.86  0.09 1.81  9.10  71.24  4.30 10.56 0.04 
8 2.94  0.26 1.85  9.96  69.40  4.55 10.73 0.32 
12 3.65  0.37  1.81  9.69  68.45  4.66  10.86  0.51 
16 3.97  0.37  1.79  9.59  68.19  4.74  10.81  0.52 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LB_ER 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_ 
EMBI 
CYC_LB_ 
GDP 
CYC_LB_
CPI 
CYC_LB_
FOREX 
CYC_ 
B_R 
CYC_LB_ 
ER 
1 0.09  0.11 4.88  3.93  2.66  0.87  8.66 78.79 
2 0.08  0.14 5.40  3.82  2.07  0.91  8.91 78.66 
4 0.25  0.48 4.71  3.36  3.62  2.21  8.14 77.21 
8 2.38  1.75 8.13  3.45  5.27  2.68  7.18 69.16 
12 5.94  2.22  7.87  3.61  5.55  2.91  6.87  65.03 
16 8.88  2.22  7.57  3.65  5.38  3.39  6.59  62.31 
 
 
Chile 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LC_GDP 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LC_
GDP 
CYC_LC_
CPI 
CYC_LC_
FOREX 
CYC_C_ 
R 
CYC_LC_ 
ER 
1 5.90  3.28 0.32  90.50  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 5.62  6.53 0.22  85.59  0.03  0.86  1.03  0.10 
4 6.70  18.84  2.04  65.88  0.13  0.55  5.59  0.26 
8 5.89  36.39  1.76  45.33  0.48  2.64  6.08  1.43 
12 4.93  41.22 1.45 36.18  5.22  3.19  4.87  2.93 
16 5.26  39.04 1.57 31.86  11.22  2.91  4.31  3.85 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LC_CPI 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LC_
GDP 
CYC_LC_
CPI 
CYC_LC_
FOREX 
CYC_C_ 
R 
CYC_LC_ 
ER 
1 0.01  6.69 0.88 0.07  92.35  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 0.06  5.65 1.33 0.31  92.44  0.19  0.01  0.01 
4 0.06  5.06 3.56 0.24  83.97  5.82  0.04  1.23 
8 0.12  8.30 6.12 0.29  73.06  10.56  0.07  1.49 
12 0.20  11.24 6.03  0.32  69.85  10.38  0.09  1.89 
16 0.22  11.80 5.86  0.32  69.46  10.00  0.09  2.25 Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
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Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LC_FOREX 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LC_
GDP 
CYC_LC_
CPI 
CYC_LC_
FOREX 
CYC_C_ 
R 
CYC_LC_ 
ER 
1 1.03  0.19 4.14 0.12  1.13  93.38  0.00  0.00 
2 0.77  0.62 3.43 0.10  1.21  93.79  0.05  0.06 
4 0.71  0.69 4.57 0.12  2.73  90.85  0.24  0.09 
8 0.73  0.67 7.71 0.16  3.30  86.79  0.55  0.08 
12 0.98  0.70  7.82  0.22  3.60  85.99  0.57  0.11 
16 1.11  0.71  7.79  0.29  3.72  85.67  0.58  0.12 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_C_R 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LC_
GDP 
CYC_LC_
CPI 
CYC_LC_
FOREX 
CYC_C_ 
R 
CYC_LC_ 
ER 
1 8.26  2.43  16.95 6.56  0.21  0.29  65.29  0.00 
2 12.43  2.13 12.04 5.20  0.22  1.68  66.19  0.11 
4 14.33  1.96 14.91 4.52  0.25  2.09  61.72  0.21 
8 12.17  3.47 22.10 4.14  1.02  2.85  54.06  0.18 
12 12.20  4.05  21.61  4.16  1.57  3.82  52.40  0.18 
16 12.33  4.32  21.37  4.29  1.84  3.85  51.75  0.25 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LC_ER 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LC_
GDP 
CYC_LC_
CPI 
CYC_LC_
FOREX 
CYC_C_ 
R 
CYC_LC_ 
ER 
1 1.84  6.77 4.09 0.42  0.40  4.14  0.00  82.32 
2 4.25  5.88 3.36 1.16  0.30  3.56  0.31  81.18 
4 4.56  6.86 3.99 1.61  0.30  3.48  0.68  78.52 
8 4.54  7.84 4.10 1.88  0.40  3.60  0.79  76.84 
12 4.65  7.83  4.08  2.02  0.67  3.60  0.81  76.35 
16 4.72  7.82  4.09  2.11  0.78  3.63  0.82  76.04 
 
 
Mexico 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LM_GDP 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LM_ 
GDP 
CYC_LM_
CPI 
CYC_LM_
FOREX 
CYC_M_ 
R 
CYC_LM_ 
ER 
1 1.14  1.58 0.71 96.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 1.48  3.70 1.73 91.70  0.48  0.00  0.00  0.91 
4 2.74  5.23 5.24 78.16  1.44  0.24  0.16  6.80 
8 3.15  5.41 5.03 66.05  3.55  0.35  3.81  12.64 
12 3.02  6.58  5.21  62.37  3.75  0.76  5.65  12.67 
16 3.16  7.79  5.12  60.18  4.75  1.06  5.73  12.22 Jean-Pierre Allegret, Alain Sand-Zantman 
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Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LM_CPI 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LM_ 
GDP 
CYC_LM_
CPI 
CYC_LM_
FOREX 
CYC_M_ 
R 
CYC_LM_ 
ER 
1 3.10  0.18 0.65  6.58  89.49  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 2.52  0.17 1.01  4.34  91.56  0.22  0.01  0.18 
4 2.29  0.24 0.86  3.48  89.08  3.86  0.02  0.18 
8 2.05  0.31 1.11  3.33  82.23  10.51  0.03  0.43 
12 2.18  0.31  1.48  3.24  80.30  11.96  0.09  0.43 
16 2.42  0.31  1.49  3.21  80.15  11.85  0.13  0.43 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LM_FOREX 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LM_ 
GDP 
CYC_LM_
CPI 
CYC_LM_
FOREX 
CYC_M_ 
R 
CYC_LM_ 
ER 
1 0.22  4.71 0.03  1.53  0.47  93.03  0.00  0.00 
2 0.25  6.55 0.08  1.16  2.55  89.20  0.10  0.11 
4 0.22  7.96 0.32  0.93  9.16  80.17  1.11  0.13 
8 1.44  9.43 0.56  0.93  15.57  68.78  2.61  0.69 
12 3.50  10.38 0.61  1.23  15.66  64.53  3.04  1.04 
16 5.23  10.76 0.63  2.42  14.99  61.79  3.02  1.15 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_M_R 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LM_ 
GDP 
CYC_LM_
CPI 
CYC_LM_
FOREX 
CYC_M_ 
R 
CYC_LM_ 
ER 
1  3.35  2.49  11.19  0.51  18.42  1.17 62.88 0.00 
2  2.61  2.12  10.05  3.77  13.34  1.23 66.63 0.26 
4  2.20  2.24  9.07 5.15  19.69  2.27 57.89 1.50 
8  2.72  3.66  7.64 5.65  22.49  7.01 49.17 1.66 
12  4.61  4.31  7.27 6.17  21.23  8.50 46.30 1.61 
16  6.59  4.44  6.98 6.46  21.35  8.24 44.31 1.63 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LM_ER 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO 
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LM_ 
GDP 
CYC_LM_
CPI 
CYC_LM_
FOREX 
CYC_M_ 
R 
CYC_LM_ 
ER 
1 0.12  2.90 0.26  0.32  0.46  0.42  20.82 74.71 
2 0.09  2.62 0.23  0.98  1.40  1.66  18.33 74.69 
4 0.14  1.76 1.46  2.97  17.50  4.51  14.94 56.71 
8 0.17  1.74 1.97  3.26  22.06  4.81  17.45 48.55 
12 0.18  2.48  2.17  3.28  21.77  4.75  17.64  47.72 
16 0.34  3.05  2.17  3.44  21.87  4.74  17.43  46.96 
 
 
 Monetary Integration Issues in Latin America: A Multivariate Assessment 
  307 
Uruguay 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LU_GDP 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LU_
GDP 
CYC_LU_
CPI 
CYC_LU_
FOREX 
CYC_U_ 
R 
CYC_LU_ 
ER 
1 0.80  0.25 3.10 95.85  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 0.54  0.16 4.94 92.59  0.05  0.40  1.20  0.12 
4 0.92  0.98  12.33  82.20  0.07  0.53  1.13  1.85 
8 1.33  2.79  15.90  69.87  0.13  0.61  6.33  3.04 
12 1.29  2.81 15.43 68.05  0.14  0.63  8.28  3.37 
16 1.27  3.18 15.50 67.32  0.18  0.70  8.25  3.59 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LU_CPI 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LU_
GDP 
CYC_LU_
CPI 
CYC_LU_
FOREX 
CYC_U_ 
R 
CYC_LU_ 
ER 
1 1.94  1.06  10.73 7.91  78.36  0.00  0.00  0.00 
2 2.17  3.56  11.15 6.41  75.91  0.58  0.23  0.00 
4 1.17  13.63  12.03 5.54  65.93  1.02  0.28  0.40 
8 5.48  32.57  8.75 3.15  41.35  1.40  4.27  3.03 
12 12.61  35.62  6.49  4.56  26.00  1.30  8.59  4.82 
16 16.01  31.10 10.04  6.46  21.63  1.04  9.05  4.68 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LU_FOREX 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LU_
GDP 
CYC_LU_
CPI 
CYC_LU_
FOREX 
CYC_U_ 
R 
CYC_LU_ 
ER 
1 0.29  0.70 0.80 1.13  0.02  97.05  0.00  0.00 
2 1.49  0.70 1.10 0.92  0.20  94.24  0.84  0.51 
4 1.49  0.74 1.00 6.21  0.22  88.05  1.50  0.79 
8 1.42  0.72 1.09 8.70  0.42  83.28  2.48  1.89 
12 1.68  0.88  1.46  8.60  0.47  81.95  2.85  2.11 
16 2.09  1.41  1.68  8.49  0.52  80.88  2.84  2.09 
                
Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_U_R 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LU_
GDP 
CYC_LU_
CPI 
CYC_LU_
FOREX 
CYC_U_ 
R 
CYC_LU_ 
ER 
1 0.07  0.00 2.70 0.48  3.76  3.02  89.97  0.00 
2 0.30  0.15 2.17 0.50  3.73  2.58  90.26  0.31 
4 0.40  0.20 1.84 1.04  3.72  2.19  90.10  0.52 
8 0.42  0.21 2.03 1.86  3.64  2.52  87.15  2.16 
12 0.63  0.22  2.74  2.12  3.64  2.69  85.52  2.44 
16 0.78  0.23  3.19  2.11  3.77  2.68  84.78  2.45 
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Decomposition of Variance for Series CYC_LU_ER 
Step 
CYC_ 
LGDPG7 
CYC_ 
LWCPNO
CYC_
EMBI
CYC_LU_
GDP 
CYC_LU_
CPI 
CYC_LU_
FOREX 
CYC_U_ 
R 
CYC_LU_ 
ER 
1 2.30  0.86 9.28 23.97  6.82  0.00  2.74  54.03 
2 2.48  1.11 8.88 19.89  7.41  0.89  2.08  57.25 
4 2.02  0.92 8.60 15.02  7.01  6.51  2.28  57.63 
8 5.06  1.94 7.95 16.17  5.89  9.36  2.25  51.38 
12 7.56  2.51 11.15 15.97  6.57  8.45  2.00  45.79 
16 8.12  2.55 13.32 15.14  7.84  8.02  1.88  43.13 
 